Big Data, Little Privacy: Tracking the Usual Suspects

In this Information Age, the most valuable commodity is our identity, our privacy and our reputation. And the tracks for collecting data about the innocent, the suspected, the convicted, the sentenced, and the exonerated are growing rapidly and reshaping the reputation landscape.1

Databases of people, crimes, accusations, professional misconduct or consumer behavior are becoming commonplace.2 Some have been created by statute or local ordinance or law enforcement; others are the product of private entrepreneurs, investigative journalists or advocacy groups.

Here is a brief sampling of the types of information repositories (or registries) that exist or have been proposed in recent years: adult abuse (elderly)3; animal abuse4; arson5; child abuse6; child support7; court records (pre-conviction)8; DNA (arrestee and convicted)9; drug possession or sale10; domestic violence11; drunk driving12; federal contractors (misconduct)13; felons14; gang membership15; gun crime16; gun ownership17; homicide18; inmate lookup19; international travelers20; landlord-tenant21; medical malpractice22; mental health23; methamphetamine laboratories24; mug shots25; paternity26; public benefits27; prescription drugs (abuse)28; probation29; sex offenses30; shaken baby31; shoplifters32; stop and frisk33; teachers (effectiveness)34; terror watch list35; and usual suspects.36

The concern with pretrial Walls of Shame and post-conviction registries is that the distinction between guilt and innocence is sometimes lost, like an online perp walk.37 Indeed, Scarlet Letter punishments, misconduct registries and even DNA sampling laws38 are gaining support at the same time that they test the limits of privacy, the presumption of innocence and due process.39 Meanwhile, legislatures and courts are struggling to set constitutional boundaries around the creation of new public and private databases.40

For the most part, expunction or opting out of a database (akin to a National Do Not Call Registry) depends on the laws and regulations governing its operation or the constitutional and common law rights that might be addressed through litigation.41

Finally, there are databases that highlight wrongful convictions or other important issues in the administration of justice, such as the National Registry of Exonerations42 or the Death Penalty Information Center (DPIC).

This article assembles recent and notable court decisions, scholarly analysis and developments about the gathering, collection and publication of information across the gamut of criminal and civil justice.


Bursac v. Suozzi, 22 Misc.3d 328 (Nassau County Sup. Ct. 2008)
“In this case of first impression, the question presented is whether the County Executive exceeded his authority or breached some constitutional protection in posting petitioner’s name, ‘mug shot’ picture and identifying information on an Internet Web site regularly maintained by the County Executive for publication of newsworthy press releases. Some of the press releases announced new driving while intoxicated (DWI) arrests in the County, which the County Executive described as the ‘Wall of Shame,’ for the announced purpose of publicizing the names and arrest pictures of ‘those who break the law by driving drunk’ and to ‘make sure their friends, neighbors and families know about it’ (press release, exhibit B to the moving papers). Counsel for petitioner states that, on or about May 30, 2008, in his official capacity, the County Executive, together with Police Commissioner Mulvey, created the ‘Wall of Shame’ and, thereafter, held numerous press conferences to publicize the ‘scarlet letter’ campaign (press release, exhibit A and, exhibit E to the moving papers), and sent the names and photographs of those accused of drunk driving and related offenses to various media outlets which were encouraged to post said information to insure that the ‘shaming’ was public and widespread (affirmation of petitioner’s attorney). . . .
It is the judgment of the court that the County Executive’s actions, in publishing and maintaining the petitioner’s name, picture and identifying information embedded in a press release on the County’s Internet Web site, which results in limitless and eternal notoriety, without any controls, is sufficient to be the ‘plus’ in the ‘stigma plus’ due process analysis in the case at bar. The court finds that the petitioner’s due process rights have been violated.”

Los Angeles County, Cal. v. Humphries, 131 S.Ct. 447 (2010)
“In Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), this Court held that civil rights plaintiffs suing a municipal entity under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 must show that their injury was caused by a municipal policy or custom. The case before the Court in Monell directly involved monetary damages. The question presented is whether the ‘policy or custom’ requirement also applies when plaintiffs seek prospective relief, such as an injunction or a declaratory judgment. We conclude that it does so apply. . . .
The two plaintiffs in this case were initially accused of child abuse. But they were later exonerated. They sought to have their names removed from the Index. Unable to convince the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department to remove them, they filed this S 1983 case against the attorney general of California, the Los Angeles County sheriff, two detectives in the sheriff’s department, and the County of Los Angeles. They sought damages, an injunction, and a declaration that the defendants had deprived them of their constitutional rights by failing to create a procedural mechanism through which one could contest inclusion on the Index. See U.S. Const., Amdt. 14; Rev. Stat. S 1979, 42 U.S.C. S 1983. The District Court for the Central District of California granted summary judgment to all of the defendants on the ground that California had not deprived plaintiffs of a constitutionally protected ‘liberty’ interest. But on appeal the Ninth Circuit disagreed. . . .
We conclude that Monell’s holding applies to S 1983 claims against municipalities for prospective relief as well as to claims for damages.”

Maracich v. Spears, 133 S.Ct. 2191 (2013)
“Concerned that personal information collected by States in the licensing of motor vehicle drivers was being released—even sold—with resulting loss of privacy for many persons, Congress provided federal statutory protection. It enacted the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, referred to here as the DPPA. See 18 U.S.C. SS2721-2725.

The DPPA regulates the disclosure of personal information contained in the records of state motor vehicle departments (DMVs). Disclosure of personal information is prohibited unless for a purpose permitted by an exception listed in 1 of 14 statutory subsections. See SS2721(b)(1)-(14). This case involves the interpretation of one of those exceptions, subsection (b)(4). The exception in (b)(4) permits obtaining personal information from a state DMV for use ‘in connection with’ judicial and administrative proceedings, including ‘investigation in anticipation of litigation.’ S2721(b)(4). The question presented is whether an attorney’s solicitation of clients for a lawsuit falls within the scope of (b)(4).

Respondents are trial lawyers licensed to practice in South Carolina. They obtained names and addresses of thousands of individuals from the South Carolina DMV in order to send letters to find plaintiffs for a lawsuit they had filed against car dealers for violations of South Carolina law. Petitioners, South Carolina residents whose information was obtained and used without their consent, sued respondents for violating the DPPA. Respondents claimed the solicitation letters were permitted under subsection (b)(4). In light of the text, structure, and purpose of the DPPA, the Court now holds that an attorney’s solicitation of clients is not a permissible purpose covered by the (b)(4) litigation exception.”

Maryland v. King, 133 S.Ct. 1958 (2013)
“In light of the context of a valid arrest supported by probable cause respondent’s expectations of privacy were not offended by the minor intrusion of a brief swab of his cheeks. By contrast, that same context of arrest gives rise to significant state interests in identifying respondent not only so that the proper name can be attached to his charges but also so that the criminal justice system can make informed decisions concerning pretrial custody. Upon these considerations the Court concludes that DNA identification of arrestees is a reasonable search that can be considered part of a routine booking procedure. When officers make an arrest supported by probable cause to hold for a serious offense and they bring the suspect to the station to be detained in custody, taking and analyzing a cheek swab of the arrestee’s DNA is, like fingerprinting and photographing, a legitimate police booking procedure that is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”

People v Smith, 15 N.Y.3d 669 (2010)
“Based on the New York City Council’s finding that gun offenders pose ‘unique dangers’ to the citizens of New York City, the City Council, effective March 24, 2007, adopted GORA, a regulatory scheme to monitor gun offenders residing within the city (see Council of City of NY Intro No. 362, Comm on Pub Safety, Rep of Governmental Affairs Div, Background [June 27, 2006]; Local Law No. 29 [2006] of City of NY). GORA states that a person convicted of specified gun offenses in a court in New York City is a ‘gun offender’ subject to registration with the New York Police Department (NYPD) (see Administrative Code of City of NY S 10-602 [d], [e]). Among other things, GORA requires that a gun offender register at the time sentence is imposed (see id. S 10-603 [a]) and personally appear at the NYPD Gun Offender Monitoring Unit within 48 hours of the date of conviction or the date of release from prison, whichever is later (see id. S 10-603 [d]). Failure to comply with GORA requirements is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine up to $1,000 and/or up to one year of imprisonment (see id. S 10-608).
We agree with the Appellate Division that GORA’s registration and notice requirements, like SORA’s, are not a ‘traditional, technical or integral’ part of defendant’s sentence or subsumed within the judgment of conviction. Notably, neither the Penal Law nor the Criminal Procedure Law directs or authorizes a sentencing court to impose GORA registration as part of a defendant’s sentence. If the sentencing court here had omitted advising defendant of his obligation to register as a gun offender, defendant would have nonetheless remained obligated to register under the terms of GORA (see Administrative Code of City of NY S 10-603 [a] [‘A gun offender shall register with the department at the time sentence is imposed’]). In other words, pursuant to the terms of GORA, the registration of a gun offender is an administrative matter between the City of New York, the NYPD, and the offender, not a component of a gun offender’s sentence to be imposed by the sentencing court.
Defendant further argues that GORA is preempted by Executive Law S 259-a. Because we conclude, as did the Appellate Division, that the imposition of GORA registration is not reviewable on direct appeal, we need not reach that argument. We observe, however, that there are appropriate means by which GORA could be challenged as preempted by state law, including a CPLR article 78 proceeding or a declaratory judgment action.”

Prall v New York City Dept. of Corr., 2013 NY Slip Op 23186 (Sup. Ct. Queens County May 23, 2013)
“Petitioner is the founder of Citizens Information Associates which operates a website called ‘Busted!’ ‘Busted!’ is a commercial website that generates revenue by posting arrest records of inmates, including their names, addresses, dates of birth, and photographs, and then charging a $68.00 fee to remove this personal information from the website. . . .
In view of the privacy interests at stake, disclosure of the records of respondents containing dates of birth and home addresses, and other personal information of inmates could easily be used to facilitate identity theft, thereby resulting in both economic and personal hardship to inmates (Matter of Scott, Sardano & Pomeranz v Records Access Officer of City of Syracuse, 65 NY2d 294 [1985]). The dates of birth of inmates, who enjoy a lesser degree of privacy, have been protected from disclosure under FOIL (Matter of Investigation Tech., LLC v Horn, 4 Misc 3d 1023[A] [2004]). The decision of respondents to deny petitioner access to dates of birth and addresses of inmates was not arbitrary and capricious nor was it an abuse of discretion. . .
Respondents have provided particularized reasons justifying their decision to deny petitioner access to inmate photographs. Relying on FOIL, petitioner is attempting to collect information from respondents in order to exploit inmates for his economic gain, with little concern for their economic and personal hardships. Petitioner seeks the personal information of inmates to solicit business for his website ‘Busted!’ It is apparent to this court that respondents have followed proper procedures and the decision to deny access to photographs of inmates was not arbitrary and capricious nor an abuse of discretion.”

State v. Phillips, 210 Md. App. 239 (Md. Court of Special Appeals 2013)
“This appeal involves Baltimore City’s Gun Offender Registration Act (the “Act” or “GORA”), a local ordinance that requires persons convicted of delineated gun offenses to register with the Police Commissioner of Baltimore City. BALT. CITY CODE, art. 19, SS 60-1(d)(1), 60-1(f), 60-3(a).[1] Appellee, Adrian Phillips, a convicted gun offender, was charged in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City with failure to register. The circuit court granted appellee’s motion to dismiss the charge because: (1) the Commissioner did not file regulations as required by the Act; and (2) the Act is unconstitutionally vague. On appeal, the State raises the following issues for our review, which we have rephrased slightly: 1. Did the circuit court err in dismissing the charge based on its finding that the Police Commissioner failed to comply with regulatory filing provisions of the Act?2. Did the circuit court err in finding the Act void for vagueness? Appellee raises three additional issues as grounds to uphold the circuit court’s dismissal of the charge: 3. Does the Act violate Equal Protection principles? 4. Does the Act violate separation of Powers principles? 5. Is the Act void because the State has preempted the field? For the reasons set forth below, we shall reverse the judgment of the circuit court.”

United States v. Kebodeaux, 186 L.Ed.2d 540 (2013)
“We here must decide whether the Constitution’s Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the power to enact SORNA’s registration requirements and apply them to a federal offender who had completed his sentence prior to the time of SORNA’s enactment. For purposes of answering this question, we assume that Congress has complied with the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto and Due Process Clauses. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U. S. 84, 105-106 (2003) (upholding a similar Alaska statute against ex post facto challenge); Supp. Brief for Kebodeaux on Rehearing En Banc in No. 08-51185 (CA5) (not raising any Due Process challenge); Brief for Respondent (same). We conclude that the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress adequate power to enact SORNA and to apply it here.”


Knowledge as Power: Criminal Registration and Community Notification Laws in America (Stanford U. Press 2009)(see Introduction at SSRN )
“Societies have long been concerned about the criminal threat posed by potentially dangerous individuals in their midst. America is surely no exception. Knowledge as Power traces the evolution of a particular strategy intended to address this anxiety – criminal registration and community notification laws. While their European origins extend back to at least the eighteenth century, America’s criminal registration laws took shape in the 1930s as a means of monitoring gangsters, thereafter experienced an extended period of desuetude and then a dramatic resurgence in the 1990s, when they were complemented by community notification laws. Today, the laws collectively function much as ‘Wanted’ posters did in the Frontier West, publicly disclosing registrants’ identifying information, involving not just law enforcement but also entire communities in the criminal monitoring process. Knowledge as Power provides the first in-depth history and analysis of criminal registration and community notification laws, examining the forces driving their rapid nationwide proliferation, as well as how the laws have fundamentally affected American society. The book’s Introduction is posted here. Other contents include: Historical Antecedents; Early Laws: 1930-1990; Modern Laws: 1990-Today; Social and Political Catalysts; Effects and Consequences; Law, Privacy, and Governance; Prospects for the Future; and Conclusion.”


Adoption Notices to Genetic Fathers: No to Scarlet Letters, Yes to Good-Faith, 36 Cumb. L. Rev. 63 (2005)
“American courts and legislatures have struggled to define the participation rights of genetic fathers in governmental adoption schemes for infants born to unwed mothers as a result of consensual sexual intercourse. Federal constitutional privacy interests in both paternity opportunity and childrearing compel a certain level of genetic father participation. However, excessive levels of participation undermine the goals of swift, final, and inexpensive adoptions, as well as deny some maternal preferences. The difficulties in balancing genetic father participation with competing interests are well illustrated by recent developments in Florida. There, the so-called ‘Scarlet Letter’ law of 2001 (effectively branding women as promiscuous and unfit parents for little reason) was rather quickly replaced by a ‘Putative Father Registry’ law in 2003. Unfortunately, neither law strikes a proper balance. Scarlet Letter laws are unwarranted (as well as unconstitutional), while putative father registries confer inadequate participation rights for unwed fathers. The most appropriate course of action would be for Florida, and other states, to incorporate a good-faith cooperation responsibility for most genetic mothers during newborn adoptions, under which mothers would have greater duties in naming or helping to name the genetic fathers of newborns who are placed for adoption.”

Be They Fish or Not Fish: The Fishy Registration of Nonsexual Offenders, 16 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 497 (2007)
“The article deals with a bizarre but common phenomenon: the registration of nonsexual criminals in sex offender registries. The practice has been challenged in a number of cases, but there is much disagreement among courts – often within the same jurisdiction – on its constitutionality, and on the analysis it entails. The issue has recently picked-up steam – reaching some state Supreme Courts (Florida’s and Illinois’), and appearing in the popular news media. The article offers a comprehensive analysis of the Substantive Due Process issues involved, showing why registering nonsexual criminal in sex offender registries is a violation of the federal Constitution (both on the part of the States and on the part of the federal government). It also shows that the registration of nonsexual criminals in sex offender registries is a textbook example of negligent policy-making (supported by faulty data), which frequently received a stamp of approval from an often-poor judicial reasoning, itself supported by an impoverished constitutional jurisprudence.”

Blacklisted: The Constitutionality of the Federal System for Publishing Reports of ‘Bad Doctors’ in the National Practitioner Data Bank, 33 Cardozo L. Rev. 2031 (2012)
“The United States has a growing number of government created blacklists, including those for convicted sexual predators, suspected gang members and suspected terrorists. The latest surprise entry in this trend is the federally created databank of ‘bad physicians’ called the National Practitioner Data Bank (‘NPDB’). Physicians are blacklisted after being ‘found’ to have provided poor quality of care through a highly subjective, and oft-times summary, peer review process conducted by private hospitals. The NPDB is first time the federal government has engaged in blacklisting since the McCarthy era.

Physician blacklisting by the NPDB has become a pressing national issue as it has serious legal and social consequences. First, the physician blacklisting process has a high risk of error as it is both over inclusive, unfairly destroying the careers of many competent physicians, and under inclusive as it ignores many incompetent physicians. Second, the NPDB reporting system encourages the perpetuation of custom-based practices undermining efforts to improve the quality and cost of healthcare through the practice of evidence-based treatment choices. Third, the NPDB system is being used to silence physician whistle-blowers which also negatively impacts quality of care. Finally, last year the NPDB expanded its scope to take on blacklisting of all licensed healthcare practitioners in the United States, including dentists, nurses, physician’s assistants and social workers, extending its reach to over six million people. This expansion magnifies the NPDB’s negative effects exponentially as it begins to affect the practice habits of all healthcare professionals.”

Concerns Associated with Expanding DNA Databases, 2 Hastings Sci. & Tech. L. J. 267 (2011)
“The establishment of DNA databases has been and continues to be a source of controversy. Proponents of DNA databases argue that it supports a discipline that does not rely on subjective judgments and interpretations, and expanding DNA databases will not only help to solve more crimes but also exonerate innocent people who have been wrongly convicted, ultimately reducing the need to reverse previous miscarriages of justice. Opponents of DNA databases, on the other hand, argue that there is a risk of DNA being used to the exclusion of material that might prove the innocence of the suspect. Also, the fact that DNA samples can be stored indefinitely raises concerns regarding the temptation to use those samples for new and unidentified purposes. This piece discusses the use of DNA in modern forensics, details the three largest DNA databases in the world, explains the process of obtaining a ‘cold hit’ and the problems surrounding related probabilities and statistics that can mislead juries and courts, analyzes the problems with existing DNA database statutes in the United States (U.S.), and considers the privacy issues surrounding DNA and DNA databases.”

Designating the Dangerous: From Blacklists to Watch Lists, 30 Seattle U. L. Rev. 65 (2006)
“This Article examines how the 21st century use of watch lists might or might not resemble the labeling of the McCarthy period, and how the experience of that era might inform an evaluation of present-day designation of the dangerous. After first describing the two labeling mechanisms, it compares them along several axes, finding that watch listing has both repeated some 1950s failings and moved on to develop some new ones of its own. In particular, because they are compiled and used in an opaque and completely one-sided process, watch lists run a substantial risk of incorrectly including many people who pose no threat.
Drawing on the experience of the 1950s, the Article assesses three ways to address this problem of false positives in the designation of the dangerous: narrowing the substantive standard for selection; adding procedural protections, particularly some form of adversarial process; and restricting the uses of the resulting list. The Article recommends that watch lists be used only to trigger surveillance, investigation, or other relatively minor impositions. In other words, the watch should be put back in watch lists. With that limitation, watch lists can serve a valuable function of separating the more threatening from the less threatening, thereby increasing the efficiency of terrorist screening and investigation.”

Digital Scarlet Letter: The Effect of Online Criminal Records on Crime, SSRN (2011)
“How does public access to criminal records affect crime? Economic theory suggests that expanding access to criminal information may increase the cost of crime to potential criminals by endangering their future work prospects and thus act as a deterrent. However, increased provision of information could also obstruct ex-convicts from finding legal employment and lead to higher recidivism rates. I [Dara N. Lee] exploit the state and time variation in the introduction of state-maintained online criminal databases – which represent a sharp drop in the cost and effort of gaining criminal background information on another person – to empirically investigate the trade-off between deterrence and recidivism. I find that online criminal records lead to a small net reduction in property crime rates, but also a marked increase of approximately 11 percent in recidivism among ex-offenders.”

Do Sex Offender Registration and Notification Laws Affect Criminal Behavior?, 54 J.L. & Econ. 161 (2011)
“Sex offenders have become the targets of some of the most far-reaching and novel crime legislation in the U.S. Two key innovations in recent decades have been registration and notification laws which, respectively, require that convicted sex offenders provide valid contact information to law enforcement authorities, and that information about sex offenders be made public. Using the evolution of state law during the 1990s and 2000s, we study how registration and notification affect the frequency of reported sex offenses and the incidence of such offenses across victims. We find evidence that registration reduces the frequency of sex offenses by providing law enforcement with information on local sex offenders. As we predict using a simple model of criminal behavior, this decrease in crime is concentrated among ‘local’ victims (e.g., friends, acquaintances, neighbors) with no evidence of less crime occurring against strangers. We also find evidence that notification has reduced crime, but not, as legislators anticipated, by disrupting the criminal conduct of convicted sex offenders. Our results instead suggest that notification deters nonregistered sex offenders, and may, in fact, increase recidivism among registered offenders by reducing the relative attractiveness of a crime-free life. This finding is consistent with work by criminologists showing that notification imposes social and financial costs on registered sex offenders, perhaps offsetting the relative benefits of forgoing criminal activity. We regard this latter finding as important, given that the purpose of notification is to reduce recidivism.”

Do Sex Offender Registries Make Us Less Safe?, Regulation, Summer 2012, at 48
“State legislatures enacted sex offender registration and notification (SORN) laws with the explicit and exclusive aim of reducing sex offender recidivism. The general idea that we ought to ‘regulate’ released offenders — of any type — to reduce the likelihood of their returning to crime is an attractive one, at least in theory. Criminal recidivism generates significant social harm. Nevertheless, despite their now-widespread use, SORN laws became the norm without any systematic study of their consequences. Admittedly, the logic underlying these laws seems at first difficult to gainsay: if a known sex offender poses even a small risk to a potential new victim, how can it hurt if the police are keeping better tabs on that offender or if the offender’s neighbors are made aware that he is a threat so they can take measures to reduce their own risk of victimization? But this question and its implied answer presume that SORN laws have no influence whatever on whether released sex offenders opt to pursue new victims in the first place. If the enforcement of notification laws imposes significant financial, social, and psychological costs on released sex offenders, as an avalanche of evidence suggests it does, then notification may in fact be criminogenic. The result may well be many more attempted attacks by convicted sex offenders and therefore higher recidivism rates on the whole, even if every individual attack attempted becomes somewhat less likely to succeed.”

Evolution of Unconstitutionality in Sex Offender Registration Laws, 63 Hastings L.J. 101 (2012)
“More is not always better. Consider sex offender registration laws. Initially anchored by rational basis, registration schemes have spiraled out of control because legislators, eager to please a fearful public, have been given unfettered freedom by a deferential judiciary.
This particular article does not challenge the state’s legislative power to enact sex offender registration laws. Instead, this piece posits that, even if sex offender registration schemes were initially constitutional, serially amended sex offender registration schemes – what this piece dubs super-registration schemes – are not. Their emergence over the last several years demands reexamination of traditionally held assumptions that shaped the original legislation.
Two intertwined causes are responsible for the schemes’ constitutional downfall. The first is a legislative body eager to draft increasingly harsh registration and notification schemes to please an electorate that subsists on a steady diet of fear. When combined with the second cause, a Supreme Court that has yet to signal much needed boundaries, the ensuing consequence is runaway legislation that is no longer rationally connected to its regulatory purpose. Ultimately, this article is a cautionary tale of legislation that has unmoored from its constitutional grounding because of its punitive effect and excessive reach.”

Expansion of Criminal Registries and the Illusion of Control, 73 La. L. Rev. 509 (2013)
“The American public consistently ranks crime prevention as the single most important objective for the criminal justice system, putting this goal ahead of punishment, enforcement, and rehabilitation. One popular but controversial method recently employed to prevent recidivism is the use of offender registries. The most common type of registry currently in use is the sex-offender registry. Responding to the public’s perception that sex offenders pose a particular risk to society, federal legislators–as well as legislators in all 50 states and the District of Columbia–have enacted legislation creating mandatory sex-offender registries. The primary rationale for tracking and notification requirements was that giving the public access to information would allow citizens to protect themselves and other vulnerable members of society. A wealth of evidence suggests that sex-offender registries have not accomplished the goal of making citizens safer. Nevertheless, lawmakers in a number of states have proposed new crime registries for offenses ranging from crimes against children, to the manufacture of methamphetamine, to murder. Moreover, poll data has revealed that the American public supports expanding registries to include crimes other than sex offenses. The rising popularity of public crime registries in spite of evidence of their inefficacy is perplexing, until one considers the social science research revealing individuals’ need to perceive control over anxiety-provoking threats. The illusion of control and attribution literature provides a rich body of work suggesting that the implementation of such registries, rather than providing any real instrumental advantage, serves to bolster feelings of self-efficacy and minimize public anxiety.”

Immigration Surveillance, SSRN (2013)
“By any measure, enforcement levels have soared in recent years, yielding a staggering, widely noted increase in the number of noncitizens expelled from the United States. However, also embedded within that growth have been major changes in the nature of immigration regulation itself, including the implementation of transformative new surveillance and ‘dataveillance’ technologies. The broader consequences of these developments, including the attendant sea change in the underlying nature of immigration enforcement, remain underappreciated.”

In Opposition to the Mandatory Registration of Juvenile Sexual Offenders, 3 J. Race, Gender & Poverty 21 (2012)
“The mandatory registration of juvenile sex offenders incorrectly assumes that the same dynamics of adult sex offenders apply to juveniles. In doing so, this group of juveniles is labeled and placed in a category that will ultimately hinder their development, rather than contribute to their rehabilitation. Accordingly, this mandated registration will have a negative effect on these individuals along with society as a whole based upon how they are perceived by others in the community and their lack of ability to contribute to the greater good.”

Invisible Man: How the Sex Offender Registry Results in Social Death, SSRN (2011)
“This Article establishes that over-criminalization serves to marginalize unwanted groups of society, and particularly regarding the sex offender registry, it results in social death. The author relies upon the notion of crime as a social construct to establish that the concept of ‘sex offense’ changes over time as society and culture evolve. From there, the author incorporates the work of Michele Foucault involving the relationship of power, knowledge, and sexuality to show how the trend toward more repressive social controls over sex-related activity is related to a shift in this relationship. The Author identifies three characteristics and the associated traits which arise when over-criminalization exists, and further shows how these characteristics and traits are present with respect to the sex offender registry. This Article offers critical insight into the relationship between over-criminalization and repressive control systems and concludes that over-criminalization exists when repressive governmental controls seize power and render non-existent informal social controls. It follows that the sex offender registry is a repressive governmental control that has concentrated power in the government and criminal laws while shifting power away from informal social controls to result in the social death of those unwanted, those labeled sex offender.”

Jurisprudence of Police Intelligence Files and Arrest Records, 22 Nat’l L. Sch. India Rev. 135 (2010)
“Law enforcement involves the twin objectives of prevention and punishment. Criminal and conviction records are often used as parameters to determine the punishment appropriate for an offender. This article considers constitutional issues that arise from the creation of arrest records and police intelligence files, and the resulting stigma attached to the names contained therein. By discussing the use of these investigative aids, and highlighting the dissonance between the records and actual convictions, the article makes a case against the use of these records in ways that incorrectly stigmatise members of civil society. It concludes by suggesting models by which the benefits of investigative records can be availed of, without the wrongful stigmatization of the persons names therein.”

On Emotion, Juvenile Sex Offenders, and Mandatory Registration, SSRN (2013)
“It is both unremarkable and true that juveniles are different from adults. United States Supreme Court decisions over the past decade have highlighted the extent of the differences. Yet, played out against the backdrop of sex offender registration laws, the conversation takes an abrupt turn. Rather than differentiating between adult and juvenile offenders, federal sex offender registration laws require juveniles convicted of certain sex offenses to face the same onerous registration and notification burdens as their adult counterparts.
Tracking the shift in sex offender registration models from ‘likely to reoffend’ to ‘conviction-based’ assessment, this article argues that ‘conviction-based’ assessment is an unstable proposition when applied to child offenders for two fundamental reasons. First, juvenile offenders lack intentionality and purpose that adult offenders possess, thereby diminishing the value that a conviction carries. Further, and more importantly, studies reveal that the commission of juvenile sex crimes does not portend future predatory behavior, raising the question of the purpose of registration for this class of offenders.
Ultimately, the legislative push to require juvenile sex offenders to suffer serious register and notification burdens demonstrates convincingly the pitfall that impacts the entire debate over sex offender registration. Emotional rhetoric controls the legislative agenda, even in the face of compelling arguments to the contrary.”

On the Lamb: Toward a National Animal Abuser Registry, 17 Animal L. 197 (2010)
“A national animal abuser registry has the potential to provide law enforcement agencies with a much-needed tool for tracking animal abusers, but no such registry exists. This Comment first discusses existing state and federal criminal registries for sex offenders, child abusers, and elder abusers. It determines that existing criminal registries often contain inaccurate entries and that they have little deterrent effect, making their potential infringement on offenders’ Constitutional rights and other collateral consequences difficult to justify.

This Comment then turns to the viability of a national animal abuse registry, discussing the link between the abuse of animals and violence towards other humans. Although no state or national animal abuse registries currently exist, several states have tried to pass legislation that would create such registries. In the absence of state-run registries, independent animal interest groups have formed registries of their own. This Comment explores the inherent drawbacks of volunteer-run, financially unaccountable organizations promulgating information about animal abusers. It then concludes that government funding and staffing could fix the accountability gaps that exist with the registries developed by private organizations and proposes a framework for a national animal abuse registry.”

Pre-Crime Restraints: The Explosion of Targeted, Non-Custodial Prevention, SSRN (2013)
“This Article exposes the ways in which non-custodial, pre-crime restraints have proliferated over the past decade, focusing in particular on three notable examples – terrorism-related financial sanctions, the No Fly List, and the array of residential, employment, and related restrictions imposed on sex offenders. Because such restraints do not involve physical incapacitation, they are rarely deemed to infringe core liberty interests. Because they are preventive, not punitive, none of the criminal law procedural protections apply. They have exploded largely unchecked – subject to little more than bare rationality review and negligible procedural protections – and without any coherent theory as to their appropriate limits.

The Article fills a gap in the literature, looking at this category of preventive, non-custodial restraints as a whole and developing a framework for evaluating, limiting, and legitimizing their use. It accepts the preventive frame in which they operate, but argues that in some instances non-custodial restraints can so thoroughly constrain an individual’s functioning that they are equivalent to de facto imprisonment and ought to be treated as such. Even in the more common case of partial restraints, enhanced substantive and procedural safeguards are needed to preserve the respect for individuals’ equal dignity, freedom of choice and moral autonomy at the heart of the liberty interest that the Constitution and a just society protect.”

Populism and Punishment: Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification in the Courts, 26 Crim. Just. (2011)
“This paper surveys Ex Post Facto Clause-based challenges brought against registration and community notification laws and considers whether recent toughening of the laws affords litigants an enhanced basis for success.”

Suspicionless DNA Collection from Arrestees Violates the Fourth Amendment, But Easier Expunction of DNA Records Can Help Mitigate the Harm, SSRN (2013)
“Suspicionless DNA collection from pre-conviction arrestees should be treated as a violation of the Fourth Amendment when it is conducted without a valid search warrant. The predominant policy justifications for that DNA collection (1) as a crime-fighting tool and/or (2) a modern identification tool, like high-tech versions of fingerprints, are not compelling enough to justify treating the process as comporting with the Fourth Amendment. Arrestees do not have the same low expectation of privacy as prisoners or convicts, and treating them as if they do violates their legal presumption of innocence. The public interest in fighting crime and identifying arrestees also fits within the ordinary role of law enforcement, meaning that those activities do not qualify for the ‘special needs’ exception to the individualized suspicion required for most Fourth Amendment searches and seizures.
However, since the Supreme Court upheld suspicionless arrestee DNA collection, analysis, and aggregation in a nationwide DNA database (in Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013)), participating states should adopt measures requiring automatic expunction of the DNA records of any arrestees who are not convicted within a reasonable amount of time from when they were arrested for the crime that led to the collection of their DNA.”

That Guy’s a Batterer!: A Scarlet Letter Approach to Domestic Violence in the Information Age, 44 Fam. L. Q. 255 (2010)
“Today we use the Internet to do everything: buy groceries, make vacation plans, download music, catch up on the news, etc. It comes as no surprise then that we also use the Internet to find love. There are Internet dating sites, social networking sites, personals on Craigslist and Yahoo, etc. There is even a booming dating security industry online that provides identity and background checks. So, if a person can learn the hobbies and favourite colors of a prospective romantic interest from their Facebook page, why shouldn’t they also be able to know if there is a history of domestic violence? This article proposes that states open up their databases to allow private individuals to find out whether a person of interest has ever had a final order of protection issued against them for domestic violence. The goal is to empower potential victims of domestic violence with this critical information so that they can avoid an intimate relationship that may lead to years of suffering and abuse.”

They’re Making a List, but Are They Checking It Twice? How Erroneous Placement on Child Offender Databases Offends Procedural Due Process, 44 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1641 (2011)
“This Comment argues that the government’s erroneous placement of individuals on a child abuser database violates a liberty interest and thus requires procedural due process. Part I examines the historical and legal background of liberty interests, procedural due process rights, and child abuser databases. Part II explores the circuit split through the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Smith and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Humphries. Part III argues that Humphries is correct, and that the government violates a liberty interest when it erroneously places individuals on child abuser databases. Moreover, states whose child abuser databases lack efficient formal removal processes violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, allowing expeditious removal of erroneous listings allows the government to protect children while respecting individuals’ liberty interests.”


Raised on the Registry: The Irreparable Harm of Placing Children on Sex Offender Registries in the US (HRW 2013)
“This 111-page report details the harm public registration laws cause for youth sex offenders. The laws, which can apply for decades or even a lifetime and are layered on top of time in prison or juvenile detention, require placing offenders’ personal information on online registries, often making them targets for harassment, humiliation, and even violence. The laws also severely restrict where, and with whom, youth sex offenders may live, work, attend school, or even spend time.”

Registering Harm: How Sex Offense Registries Fail Youth Communities (JPI 2008)
“Congress passed the Adam Walsh Act, a federal law that requires states to include children as young as age 14 on registries — often for the rest of their lives — in an attempt to protect our children from sexual violence. But the Adam Walsh Act won’t keep our children safe. Instead, this law will consume valuable law enforcement resources, needlessly target children and families, and undermine the very purpose of the juvenile justice system.”

Sex Offender Registration and Notification in the United States: Current Case Law and Issues (DOJ 2012)
“The statutes, regulations and laws addressing sex offender registration and notification in the United States are varied and complex. While this handbook seeks to provide updated and accurate information, practitioners are advised to conduct their own research to confirm that they are utilizing the most current information available.”

Tracked and Trapped: Youth of Color, Gang Databases and Gang Injunction (YJC 2012)
“Tracked and Trapped, a new report by the Youth Justice Coalition, has found that transparency and accountability are lacking in California’s gang database. It represents a preliminary report from a larger research project, which is the first large scale assessment of the effects of California’s gang databases and gang injunctions on those most impacted—the people listed on injunctions and databases, their friends and family, and as residents that live in areas covered by gang injunctions.” See What’s Wrong with California’s Gang Databases and Gang Injunctions (Open Soc’y Jan. 22, 2013).


Constitutional Challenges to State Child Abuse Registries, 36 A.L.R.6th 475
“The intent of a statute prohibiting the endangering of the life, limb, health, or morals of a child is to protect the physical health, morals, and well-being of children, and this solicitude relates not only to sexual offenses, but to other dangers as well. The legislative policy of protecting minors from the abuse that underlies these types of statutes does not support a narrow construction of the statutory terms and definitions, for statutory provisions relating to child abuse reporting, investigation, and rehabilitation are remedial in nature and deserve a liberal construction. State child abuse reporting statutes, while they create a life or liberty interest in an abused minor child, do not create a private cause of action. Statutes or municipal ordinances sometimes require persons previously convicted of crime to register with designated officials. It has been held unconstitutional to punish under such an ordinance a person whose default was completely innocent in that he or she was unaware of the requirement and there were no circumstances to put him or her on inquiry. Criminal registration statutes have generally withstood challenges based on allegations that they deny equal protection of the laws, and that they violate constitutional prohibitions against bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and cruel and unusual punishment. Some jurisdictions have state registries requiring the jurisdiction to have, in one central location, the names of all known subjects of indicated reports of child abuse and maltreatment so that the information may be used when needed to conduct appropriate investigations and database checks, either for the protection of children named in those reports or for the protection of other children who might come into contact with the report’s subject. The registry will typically receive telephone calls alleging child abuse, and, when any allegations contained in such calls could reasonably constitute a report of abuse of a child, the allegations are immediately transmitted by the registry to an appropriate organization for investigation. Constitutional challenges have been brought to state child abuse registries specifically. In Finch v. New York State Office of Children and Family Services, 499 F. Supp. 2d 521, 36 A.L.R.6th 893 (S.D. N.Y. 2007), for example, in which subjects of indicated reports of child abuse and maltreatment brought a 42 U.S.C.A. S 1983 action against state defendants, alleging that inordinate delays in the scheduling of hearings in which they challenged their listing in a statewide register of child abuse violated their constitutional rights, the court held that the state’s action in listing subjects of indicated reports in the registry impaired a due process protected liberty interest. This annotation discusses the cases that have considered constitutional challenges to state child abuse registries.”

Construction and Application of U.S. Const. Art. I, S 9, cl. 3, Proscribing Federal Bills of Attainder, 62 A.L.R.6th 517
“Framers of the U.S. Constitution believed that barriers had to be erected so that the legislature would not overstep its authority and perform the functions of other branches of government, namely the judiciary. Congressional bills of attainder, defined as legislative acts that inflict punishment without a judicial trial, are proscribed by U.S. Const. Art. I, S 9, cl. 3, which reflects the framers’ belief that the legislative branch is not so well suited as politically independent judges and juries to the task of ruling upon the blameworthiness of, and levying appropriate punishment upon, specific persons. Many courts have addressed construction and application of U.S. Const. Art. I, S 9, cl. 3, proscribing federal bills of attainder. For instance, in ACORN v. U.S., 618 F.3d 125, 62 A.L.R.6th 777 (2d Cir. 2010), the court found that Congressional appropriations laws which barred a specific national organization from receiving federal funds were not bills of attainder, since the withholding of funds did not constitute punishment. This annotation collects and discusses all cases in which courts have considered the construction and application of U.S. Const. Art. I, S 9, cl. 3, proscribing federal bills of attainder.”

Construction and Application of U.S. Const. Art. I, S 10, cl. 1, and State Constitutional Provisions Proscribing State Bills of Attainder, 63 A.L.R.6th 1
“Framers of the United States Constitution believed that barriers were required to prevent state legislatures from overstepping their authority and attempting to perform the functions of other branches of government, namely the judiciary. State bills of attainder, defined as legislative acts that inflict punishment upon specified individuals or groups without a judicial trial, are proscribed by the United States Constitution, U.S. Const. Art. I, S 10, cl. 1, as well as state constitutional provisions. Many courts have addressed construction and application of U.S. Const. Art. I, S 10, cl. 1 and state constitutional provisions prohibiting state bills of attainder. In State v. Whitaker, 364 N.C. 404, 700 S.E.2d 215, 63 A.L.R.6th 755 (2010), for example, the Supreme Court of North Carolina found that a state statute barring possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of any felony, N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. S 14-415.1, did not constitute a state bill of attainder prohibited by U.S. Const. Art. I, S 10, cl. 1 and the North Carolina Constitution, N.C. Const. art. I S 16, as it did not impose punishment on a selected group of persons without a judicial trial. This annotation collects and discusses all cases in which courts have construed and applied U.S. Const. Art. I, S 10, cl. 1 and state constitutional provisions proscribing state bills of attainder.”

Propriety of Probation Condition Exposing Defendant to Public Shame or Ridicule, 65 A.L.R.5th 187
“Sentencing courts may impose probation conditions that foster a defendant’s rehabilitation and protect the public from the type of conduct that led to the defendant’s conviction. Trial courts have wide discretion in fashioning the conditions of a defendant’s probation. That discretion, however, is not boundless. The exercise of discretion must be reasonable and is limited by certain constitutional safeguards. When the primary purpose of the probation condition is to shame or stigmatize the defendant, the probation condition may be deemed unreasonable and stricken. For example, in People v. Meyer, 176 Ill. 2d 372, 223 Ill. Dec. 582, 680 N.E.2d 315, 65 A.L.R.5th 695 (1997), reh’g denied, (June 2, 1997), the court held that a defendant convicted of aggravated assault could not be required, as a condition of probation, to erect signs at the entrances to his family farm reading ‘Warning! A Violent Felon lives here.’ Other cases have reached contrary results depending upon the particular circumstances presented and the varying rules applied by the courts. This annotation collects and analyzes those cases in which courts have considered the propriety of probation conditions that expose a defendant to public shame or ridicule.”

State Statutes or Ordinances Requiring Persons Previously Convicted of Crime to Register With Authorities, 36 A.L.R.5th 161
“Increasing public concern about crime has caused more and more jurisdictions to pass criminal registration legislation. Designed to protect communities and facilitate law enforcement by making persons convicted of registrable crimes readily available for police surveillance, such legislation generally imposes a life-long duty upon certain convicted persons, upon release from prison or at the onset of probation, to register with local authorities and reregister upon each change of address. Not surprisingly, challenges to the validity of criminal registration statutes have been made on varied constitutional grounds. In Doe v Poritz (1995 NJ) 662 A2d 367, 36 ALR5th 711, for example, the court upheld a sex offender registration statute challenged on the basis of prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment and ex post facto laws, and of constitutional guarantees of equal protection and the right of privacy, among others. This annotation collects and analyzes those cases in which the courts have considered the validity, construction, and application of state criminal registration statutes and ordinances which require a convicted person to register with law enforcement or other governmental authorities.”

State Statutes or Ordinances Requiring Persons Previously Convicted of Crime to Register with Authorities as Applied to Juvenile Offenders — Constitutional Issues, 37 A.L.R.6th 55
“Statutory schemes sometimes require persons previously convicted of a crime, such as those involving sexual offenses, drugs, or gang activity, to register with designated officials. Some states, for example, have enacted mandatory sex offender registration laws requiring individuals convicted of sex offenses to register with local law enforcement agencies upon release from confinement or upon moving. Various constitutional issues may arise when such criminal registration statutes or ordinances are applied to juvenile offenders. For example, the court in In re Richard A., 946 A.2d 204, 37 A.L.R.6th 721 (R.I. 2008), determined that a state sex offender registration act was constitutional as applied to juveniles, that the registration requirement did not impermissibly remove the confidentiality associated with the juvenile justice system, and that application of the registration requirement to a juvenile did not give rise to a constitutional right to a jury trial in a delinquency proceeding. This annotation collects and discusses those cases which have considered constitutional issues relating to the application, as to juvenile offenders, of state statutes or ordinances requiring persons previously convicted of a crime to register with authorities.”

State Statutes or Ordinances Requiring Persons Previously Convicted of Crime to Register with Authorities as Applied to Juvenile Offenders—Duty to Register, Requirements for Registration, and Procedural Matters, 38 A.L.R.6th 1
“Statutory schemes sometimes require persons previously convicted of a crime, such as those involving sexual offenses, drugs, or gang activity, to register with designated officials. Some states, for example, have enacted mandatory sex offender registration laws requiring individuals convicted of sex offenses to register with local law enforcement agencies upon release from confinement or upon moving. Courts have been called upon to construe and apply state statutes or ordinances requiring juvenile offenders previously convicted of a crime to register with authorities. For example, in the case of In re Derrick B., 39 Cal. 4th 535, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 13, 139 P.3d 485, 38 A.L.R.6th 683 (2006), the court held that a registration requirement for juvenile sex offenders was limited to a statutory list of specific offenses giving rise to a registration requirement upon discharge or parole from the Youth Authority, and, as sexual battery was not included in that list, the registration requirement issued the juvenile offender was not authorized. This annotation collects and discusses those cases which have considered, as applied to juvenile offenders, the construction and application of state statutes or ordinances requiring persons previously convicted of a crime to register with authorities with regard to the duty to register, requirements for registration, and other procedural matters.”

Validity, Construction, and Application of Federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 U.S.C.A. SS 16901 et seq., its Enforcement Provision, 18 U.S.C.A S 2250, and Associated Regulations, 30 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 213
“On July 27, 2006, Congress enacted the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). It provides for nationwide registration of sex offenders and provides criminal penalties for failure to register. It has faced numerous constitutional challenges in the federal courts. The court in U.S. v. Powers, 544 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 30 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 749 (M.D. Fla. 2008), held that the provision of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act criminalizing the failure of a sex offender convicted under a state statute to register or update registration as required by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) did not regulate activities that substantially affected interstate commerce, and thus, it was beyond the scope of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. This annotation collects and discusses cases which have considered the validity, construction, and application of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act.”

Validity, Construction, and Application of State Statutes Imposing Criminal Penalties for Failure to Register as Required Under Sex Offender or Other Criminal Registration Statutes, 33 A.L.R.6th 91
“Statutes or municipal ordinances sometimes require persons previously convicted of a crime to register with designated officials. It has been held unconstitutional to punish under such an ordinance a person whose default was completely innocent in that he or she was unaware of the requirement. Some states have enacted mandatory sex offender registration laws requiring individuals convicted of sex offenses to register with local law-enforcement agencies upon release from confinement or upon moving. The purpose of a statute requiring registration of sex offenders is to protect the public from the danger and propensity for recidivism of convicted sex offenders, and to assure that persons convicted of the crimes enumerated therein shall be readily available for police surveillance at all times, because the legislature has deemed them likely to commit similar offenses in the future. The registration of a sex offender is a reasonable means for achieving its purposes of protecting the public and is completely consistent with the exercise of the state’s police power. It has been held that a sexual predator classification subjecting a convicted sex offender to registration and public notification requirements under a sexual predators act based solely on a qualifying conviction for an enumerated sex offense does not violate the separation of powers doctrine by allegedly wresting from the courts the discretion to determine whether the offender should be declared a sexual predator. The issue arises as to the validity, construction, and application of state statutes imposing criminal penalties for failure to register as required under sex offender or other criminal registration statutes. In Garrison v. State, 950 So. 2d 990, 33 A.L.R.6th 621 (Miss. 2006), for example, the court held that, in prosecutions for failure to register as a sex offender under a state statute, where circumstances are completely lacking that might move one to inquire as to the necessity of registration, and where the defendant’s conduct is merely passive, the state must prove actual knowledge of the duty to register or proof of the probability of such knowledge and a subsequent failure to comply with the duty to register. In order to sustain a conviction, the court pointed out, the jury must find that the state has proved that the defendant had actual knowledge of the duty to register, or that the state proved the probability of such knowledge. If, however, the court declared, the state failed to convince the jurors beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew of the duty to register or of the probability of such knowledge, then the defendant should be exonerated. This annotation collects those cases in which the courts have analyzed the validity, construction, and application of state statutes imposing criminal penalties for failure to register as required under sex offender or other criminal registration statutes.”


1 See, e.g., Craig Timberg and Ellen Nakashima, State Photo-Id Databases Become Troves for Police, Wash. Post, June 16, 2013; Aliya Sternstein, Eye on Crime: The FBI Is Building a Database of Iris Scans, NextGov, June 27, 2012.

2 See generally Erica Goode, State Seek Criminal Registries for Murder, Arson and More Offenses, N.Y. Times, May 21, 2011, at A1(“Advocates for online registries, many of them searchable by the public, argue that people have a right to know about potentially dangerous offenders in their midst and that the benefit of alerting parents, neighbors and others in a community outweighs any privacy concerns. But as the registries proliferate, so do questions about their value. Critics say that while the registries are attractive to politicians who want to appear tough on crime, they often do little more than spread fear and encourage vigilantism.”); States Create More Registries to Track, Deter Criminals, WKBT, Feb. 26, 2007(“More states are taking the sex offender registry the next step by tracking a wider swath of convicts. Such an effort is proposed in Wisconsin. Representative Scott Suder of Abbotsford is drafting legislation to set up a violent offender registry at the urging of friends of murder victim Leah Gustafson. She was killed by neighbor last year in Superior. The fate of the proposal is unclear. Republicans control the Assembly, but the bill could run into trouble in the Democrat-led Senate or with Governor Doyle. The state’s sex offender registry alone costs nearly two million dollars annually. Still, Suder wants a database that would include murderers, kidnappers, arsonists and terrorists. Online databases can tell users whether the person mowing the lawn next door ever cooked methamphetamine, kidnapped a child or killed somebody.”).

3 See, e.g., Preying for Seniors: Registry Sought for Abusers of Adults, Courier-Journal, Dec. 20, 2010.

4 See, e.g., Tracking Animal Abuse (and Abusers) on the Web, The Crime Rep., Jan. 16, 2011; Law Creates First Animal Abuse Registry, Colum. Daily Trib., Oct. 15, 2010.

5 See, e.g., H.R. 1727 (111th): Managing Arson Through Criminal History (MATCH) Act of 2009 (“An Act To establish a national criminal arsonist and criminal bomber registry program and establish guidelines and incentives for States, territories and tribes to participate in such program.”).

6 See generally State Child Abuse Registries (Nat’l Res. Ctr. for Permanency and Family Connections Hunter College School of Social Work).

7 See, e.g., Westchester County in N.Y. Cracks Down on Deadbeat Dads with Newspaper Advertisement, News on 6, Oct. 19, 2006.

8 See, e.g., Caitlin Cleary, Legal Skeletons in Your Closet May Go Online: Pre-Conviction Information Available Jan. 1, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Dec. 18, 2006.

9 See, e.g., Combined DNA Index System (CODIS); Joseph Goldstein, Police Agencies Are Assembling Records of DNA, N.Y. Times, June 13, 2013, at A1.

10 See, e.g., Milan Simonich, Lawmaker Wants Drug-Dealer Registry, El Paso Times, Jan. 2, 2013; Linda Saslow, Increase in Heroin Use Leads to Proposed Laws, N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 2008, at L16.

11 See, e.g., Texas House Passes Domestic Violence Registry Legislation, CBS DFW, May 10, 2013; Lawmakers Call for Domestic Violence Offender Registry, Albany Times Union, Apr. 18, 2011.

12 See, e.g., Mal Leary, Maine Rep. Proposes Online Registry of Drunken Drivers, Bangor Daily News, Apr. 3, 2011; New DUI Law Tougher, But Loopholes Still Exist, Lawrence Journal-World, Aug. 14, 2011(“That’s one of the issues the new DUI law addresses, in the form of a central DUI repository, or database, to track the state’s DUI offenders. In essence, law enforcement and prosecutors will need to search only one database to find out how often someone has been convicted or arrested for a DUI, and all municipalities are required to participate.”).

13 See POGO’s Federal Contractor Misconduct Database (Project on Government Oversight (POGO)).

14 See, e.g., ‘Brittany’s Law’ Passes State Senate, Moves to Assembly, Observer-Dispatch, June 12, 2013(violent felons).

15 See, e.g., Critics Question Minnesota Database of Gang Associates, The Crime Report, Dec. 2, 2009.

16 See, e.g., Justin Fenton, Baltimore’s Gun Offender Registry Upheld, Baltimore Sun, March 20, 2013.

17 See, e.g., State Will Develop Handgun Database, Albany Times Union, March 26, 2013; Jon Campbell, N.Y. Law Allows Gun Data to Stay Private, USA Today, Jan. 15, 2013(discussing S2230-2013: Enacts the NY SAFE Act of 2013); Rick Karlin, Gun List Site Returns, Albany Times Union, July 28, 2010; Jorge Fitz-Gibbon, Handgun Owners Irate Over Having Names Published Online, Journal News, Dec. 17, 2006.

18 See, e.g., Convicted Murderer Registry to Go Live on New Year’s Day, CBS Chicago, Dec. 30, 2011.

19 See generally Laurence P. Maloney, Take a Tour of DOC Web Sites: Gonna Get Connected, 5 Corrections Tech. and Mgmt. 44 (2001).

20 See Michael J. Sniffen, Feds Rate Travelers for Terrorism, Assoc. Press., Nov. 30, 2006 (Automated Targeting System applied to people).

21 See, e.g., Gerald Lebovits and Jen M. Addonizio, The Use of Tenant Screening Reports and Tenant Blacklisting, LEGALEase Pamphlet, N.Y. St. Bar Ass’n, 2012.

22 See, e.g., Daniel Solove, Online Blacklisting of Medical Malpractice Plaintiffs, Concurring Ops., July 26, 2006.

23 See, e.g., Kyle Hopkins, Alaska Legislator Wants to List Dangerous Mentally Ill, Anchorage Daily News, July 18, 2007.

24 See, e.g., Michael Glenn Easter, Are You Living in a Former Meth Lab?, Scienceline, Apr. 28, 2010 (mentioning the DEA’s National Clandestine Laboratory Register); Illinois Meth Address Database To Go Public, but Not Missouri’s, St. Louis Post-Dispatch – McClatchy-Tribune, Dec 22, 2008.

25 See generally David Kravets, Mug-Shot Industry Will Dig Up Your Past, Charge You to Bury It Again, Wired Mag., Aug. 2, 2011; Steven Rosen, Old Mug Shots Fuel Art, and a Debate on Privacy, N.Y. Times, Aug, 28, 2011, at A21; Cheryl Conner, Dark Side of Reputation Management: How It Affects Your Business, Forbes, May 9, 2013(“mugshot extortionists”). See also Prall v New York City Dept. of Corr., 2013 NY Slip Op 23186 (Sup. Ct. Queens County May 23, 2013).

26 See, e.g., Tamar Lewin, Unwed Fathers Fight for Babies Placed for Adoption by Mothers, N.Y. Times, March 19, 2006. See generally Putative Father Registry (Wikipedia).

27 See, e.g., Anemona Hartocollis, Concern for Vast Social Services Database on the City’s Neediest, N.Y. Times, June 17, 2011, at A 31.

28 See, e.g., Amanda R. Lamberson, The Internet System for Tracking Over-Prescribing (I-STOP) Act, Touro L. Rev. Online, Apr. 15, 2013; Florida’s Prescription Drug Monitoring Database OK’d, Partnership at Drug Free Newsroom, Apr. 11, 2011. See generally Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs: An Assessment of the Evidence for Best Practices (Pew 2012).

29 See, e.g., Heather Steeves, Maine Makes Public New Database of Inmates and Felons on Probation, Bangor Daily News, Jan. 10, 2012.

30 See, e.g., Nassau DA to Name 104 Suspected Johns, Newsday, June 1, 2013 (Prostitution Sting Nets 104, Newsday, June 2, 2013 at A22)(“Lawyers across the county say their clients, largely professionals such as engineers, doctors and lawyers, are on pins and needles waiting to know if Nassau District Attorney Kathleen Rice will release their names and mug shots at a news conference Monday. Law enforcement sources say they will.”). See generally Fifty State Survey of Adult Sex Offender Registration Requirements (NIC/WCL Project on Addressing Prison Rape 2009).

31 See, e.g., Chris Essig, Illinois House Supports Adding Shaken Baby Deaths to Registry, Herald Review, March 26, 2010.

32 See, e.g., Molly McDonough, Online Posting of Accused Shoplifter Photos Stirs Debate, ABA J Law News Now, Apr. 8, 2008.

33 See, e.g., Governor Paterson Signs “Stop and Frisk” Bill into Law: Prohibits Entry of Personal Information into Police Database on Basis of Justice and Basic Rights of an Individual, N.Y. Gov. Press Rel., July 16, 2010(discussing A.11177-A/S.7945-A); Al Baker, Council Leaders Want Fewer Names on List of Police Stops, N.Y. Times, March 11, 2010, at A 28.

34 See, e.g., Ian Lovett, Teacher’s Death Exposes Tensions in Los Angeles, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 2010, at A23.

35 See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Even Those Cleared of Crimes Can Stay on F.B.I.’s Watch List, N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 2011, at A1; Feds Build Database on People Said To Be Acting Suspiciously, The Crime Rep., Dec. 20, 2010. See also ACLU Files Lawsuit Challenging Unconstitutional “No Fly List” (ACLU June 30, 2010).

36 See, e.g., Wendy Ruderman, New Tool for Police Officers: Records at Their Fingertips, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 2013, at A17; Morris County Prosecutor Robert Bianchi Asks Police to Make Lists of ‘Worst’ Criminals, N.J. Star-Ledger, Jan. 26, 2010.

37 See generally Ryan Hagglund, Constitutional Protections Against the Harms to Suspects in Custody Stemming From Perp Walks, 7 Miss. L.J. 1757 (2012); Ernest F. Lidge III, Perp Walks and Prosecutorial Ethics, 7 Nev. L.J. 55 (2006).

38 See Maryland v. King, 133 S.Ct. 1958 (2013); DNA Laws Database (NCSL).

39 See generally J.D. Tuccille, The Surveillance State Isn’t Coming—It’s Already Here, Reason, July 3, 2013.

40 See, e.g., Joseph Goldstein, Police Agencies Are Assembling Records of DNA, N.Y. Times, June 13, 2013, at A1.

41 See, e.g., Bill Keller, Erasing History, N.Y Times, Apr. 28, 2013; Class Claims Credit Reporter Misidentified ‘Hundreds or Thousands’ as Sex Offenders, Courthouse News, Aug. 25, 2011; Adam Liptak, Expunged Criminal Records Live to Tell Tales, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 2006.

42 Joint Project of University of the Michigan Law School and the Center on Wrongful Convictions at Northwestern University School of Law.

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